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This essay extends theoretical arguments pertaining to single (uniplex) networks on how to 
solve coordination and cooperation problems associated with institutional collective action to 
multiplex networks constituting both formal and informal relationships formed by policy actors. 
While coordination problems reflect difficulties for actors in arriving at jointly desired policy 
outcomes, cooperation problems mean that actors have conflicting interests and, thus, face incen-
tives to defect on each other. We propose multiplex versions of bridging and bonding networks, 
which have been found suitable for solving coordination and cooperation problems in single 
networks. Although our approach is limited to the simultaneous analysis of formal and informal 
relationships in policy networks, the arguments we present should aid researchers interested 
in analyzing policy networks beyond these manifestations of inherently complex relationships.
Keywords: Multiplex networks, institutional collective action problems, collaborative 
governance.
1. Introduction
Scholars have long recognized the multidimensionality of social systems in which 
large numbers of social agents are interconnected by a wide range of social relationships. 
These relationships include friendship, professional ties, exchanges of resources, such 
as information, goods and services, etc. While each type of relationship in these multi-
plex networks can be studied in isolation, a comprehensive analysis of a social system is 
incomplete without examining how the different types of relationships affect each other 
(Robins & Pattison, 2006; Bae & Feiock, 2012).
Studying multiplex networks are particularly important for solving institutional col-
lective action dilemmas arising from the fragmentation of political and administrative 
authority in contemporary societies (Feiock, 2013). Fragmentation makes governance 
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inherently complex, since a broad range of public, non-profit, and private organizations cre-
ate a variety of formal and informal relationships in the management and delivery of public 
goods and services (Kettle, 2000; Feiock, 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 2010). Interdependen-
cies among these organizations produce the need for coordinated behavior, which can be 
more easily accomplished in networks with certain features facilitating such behavior.
Formal relationships can be defined in statutes, which prescribe what a policy net-
work should look like, or in contractual agreements that define the terms of relationships 
between two or more institutions (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; 
McGuire, 2002; Meier & O’Toole, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2006). But beyond the for-
mal relationships, there are also informal links that may be formed between institutions 
for a variety of reasons, including similar ideological positions or policy views and agree-
ments on organizational goals. Network structures emerge from these relationships that 
can shape the performance and stability of decision-making systems thus affecting the 
design and implementation of public policies (Feiock & Scholz, 2010). For example, in 
metropolitan service provision, local governments maintain contractual relationships with 
their peers for multiple services (Shrestha & Feiock, 2009; Shrestha, 2010; Andrew, 2009), 
but they may also be connected to each other through informal ties when they exchange 
information or meet one another in regional decision-making venues.
Considerable progress has been made in the policy sciences in understanding single 
types of relationships among actors in isolation, either formal (Andrew, 2009; Minkoff, 
2012, 2013; Post, 2004; Shrestha, 2010;) or informal (Andrew & Carr, 2012; Feiock, 2009, 
2013; Feiock, Lee, & Park, 2012; Lazer, 2011; Lee, Feiock, & Lee, 2012; Schneider, Scholz, 
Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003; Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008). Much less progress 
has been made in understanding the inherently multiplex character of these networks as 
they operate together. As a result, important questions remain unanswered. Perhaps the most 
basic one is: How do actors shape their formal and informal relationships with each other 
when they face different types of institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas?
Our aim in this essay is to start a scholarly conversation that can lead to finding precise 
answers to this question. We believe this is an important endeavor because of the pervasive-
ness of ICA dilemmas and the ever-growing need to better understand the rather complex 
ways in which policy actors relate to each other when trying to solve those problems.
This essay proceeds first with a description of institutional collective action (ICA) 
problems. Then it discusses how those problems can be tackled by utilizing bridging and/
or bonding capital in multiplex networks. Next, it introduces propositions for specific 
types of bonding and bridging configurations that one should expect to see when policy 
actors face coordination and cooperation problems. Finally, the essay highlights the limi-
tations of and opportunities for analyzing multiplex networks.
2. ICA Dilemmas and Networks
Institutional Collective Action dilemmas arise from the fragmentation of authority in 
governance systems where policy decisions made by one jurisdiction to pursue its goals 
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are at odds with the activities or the collective benefits of the affected jurisdictions. These 
dilemmas are likely to manifest in the form of either coordination or cooperation prob-
lems. The former occurs when actors such as local governments have similar goals but 
disagree on how to reach them. For example, in metropolitan areas where multiple local 
governments coexist, shared interests in managing traffic flow to avoid congestion and 
gridlock lead cities to coordinate road construction, lane closures and the timing of traffic 
signals. Cooperation problems, on the other hand, take place when actors have conflicting 
goals and they are likely to defect on each other in order to reach those goals. For instance, 
cities trying to increase their tax base by attracting new businesses and investments may 
engage in offering competitive concessions that may lead to collective loss to the cities 
in the region.
Studies show that policy actors develop both formal and informal relationships 
to mitigate these types of problems (Feiock, 2013; Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Lubell, 
Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002). For instance, local jurisdictions can become mem-
bers of regional economic development partnerships in order to coordinate their economic 
development decisions (Feiock, Chen, & Hseih, 2016). Similarly, local governments can 
create networks of formal service contracts to minimize the risk of potential defection 
associated with the difficulty of monitoring contracts (Andrew, 2009; Shrestha, 2008; 
Shrestha & Feiock, 2013). In addition, representatives of the jurisdictions (either elected 
or appointed) can build mutual trust through informal exchange of information or meet-
ing at shared venues in order to prevent potential non-compliance of the mutually agreed 
terms of contracts that are not easily verifiable. 
Unfortunately, the specialized literature in public administration and policy has 
lagged behind in examining how these formal and informal relationships among policy 
actors help solve ICA problems. As a result, most analyses examining either formal or 
informal relationships have the obvious limitation of producing an oversimplified view 
of how collaborative processes really work.
3. Solving Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Multiplex Networks
Coordination and cooperation problems pose different challenges for policy actors 
in fragmented governance systems. In the presence of coordination problems, actors are 
interested in achieving a goal that they collectively deem valuable. This means that solving 
coordination problem requires that the actors exchange information in a way that allows 
them to converge on preferred courses of actions. Cooperation problems, on the other 
hand, are characterized by conflicting interests that can lead to widespread defection. In 
this type of scenario, actors require information that can help them detect and punish 
defection, which contributes to sustaining cooperation.
Previous research ties the solution to these types of problems to the existence of par-
ticular network configurations that can be formed in networks. Berardo & Scholz (2010), 
for instance, contend that actors facing coordination problems in networks seek to engage 
in structural relationships that give them quick access to relevant information on how 
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others are likely to act. Using data collected in self-organizing policy networks in 10 US 
estuaries, they show that bridging structures that are likely to facilitate quick convergence 
of policy views emerge when coordination problems are dominant.
On the other hand, when actors face cooperation problems, they are more prone 
to form bonding structures where redundant information flows among the members of 
the structure. This, in turn, helps promote and sustain cooperation because defection be-
comes costly as actors in the network can detect “cheaters” and inform others about their 
behavior (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000).
Studying bridging and bonding structures is relatively straightforward in uniplex 
networks, where only one type of relationship is examined. In multiplex networks, how-
ever, it is somewhat difficult to determine how actors form bridging and bonding structures 
conducing for solving coordination and cooperation problems.
Table 1 contains structural configurations that we believe can be used to examine 
bridging and bonding in multiplex networks involving formal (black lines) and informal 
(red lines) relationships. Configuration 1A represents bridging through the establishment 
of multiplex in-stars. Configurations 1B to 1F represent bonding through the establish-
ment of dyadic multiplex reciprocity (figure 1B) and four types of closed structures that 
indicate bonding where one of the links is informal and the other is formal (or vice versa). 
Table 1
Structural Configurations for Solving Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Multiplex Networks
Type of ICA Problem  
(and configurations that 
solve them)
Description Illustrative Structural Configurations
Coordination Problems 
(solved through Bridging 
configurations)
Multiplex in-stars
(1A)
Multiplex reciprocity
(1B)
Multiplex transitive  
closure
(1C)
Cooperation Problems 
(solved through Bonding 
configurations)
Multiplex cyclic  
closure
(1D)
Multiplex closure  
for shared out-ties
(1E)
Multiplex closure  
for shared in-ties
(1F)
Note: Black lines represent formal relations and red lines represent informal relations among actors.
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We borrow these configurations from the research on Exponential Random Graph models 
applied to multiplex networks (e.g. Koehly & Pattison, 2005; Lomi & Pattison, 2006; 
Pattison & Wasserman, 1999; Wang, 2013; Wang, Robins & Pattison, 2009). This set of 
configurations should not be thought of as an exhaustive group of structures that indicates 
bonding or bridging; it is, rather, a straightforward way of showcasing the concepts in a 
simple multiplex setting (simple in the sense that there are only two types of relationships).1
Next, we discuss how actors form bridging and bonding configurations that are 
linked to solving coordination and cooperation problems in multiplex networks involving 
formal and informal relationships.
4. Solving Coordination Problems through Bridging in Multiplex Networks
We contend that actors facing coordination problems may benefit from creating 
multiplex in-stars. An in-star represents bridging because there is a central actor in the 
network that indirectly connects other actors (nodes) that would be completely discon-
nected in its absence.
The central (most popular) actor in the network functions as a depository of infor-
mation and experience from both its formal and informal connections to others and is 
well positioned to control how those resources flow between other actors linked to it. For 
example, in metropolitan service delivery, counties and cities that are parties to multiple 
service contracts are able to gain economies of scale and economies of scope in production 
by entering into service contracts (or exchanging information informally) with a central 
city in the network that is heavily involved in exchanging information with other jurisdic-
tions (or in entering service contracts with them). Attracting many service contracts means 
that the popular provider can consolidate the demand and coordinate the use of production 
and managerial inputs in service production leading to gains in economies of scale and 
economies of scope for all cities involved. In addition, informal exchange of information 
can lead to finding ways of enhancing economies of scale and scope benefits for all parties.
Because of the central position in the multiplex in-star configuration, the popular 
provider is also likely to be perceived as credible and competent, which is a critical piece 
of information for other nodes when they are looking for potential partners (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999).
5. Solving Cooperation Problems through Bonding in Multiplex Networks
Actors facing cooperation problems can create bonding network structures that 
facilitate the flow of overlapping information among the participants. This, in theory, may 
enable them to detect and punish defective behavior thereby ensuring credibility of com-
mitment necessary to achieve cooperation. This reasoning is directly applied to uniplex 
1 The prevalence of these structures in multiplex networks can be modeled with the XPNet software available 
at http://sna.unimelb.edu.au/PNet.
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networks where the links between the actors contain information about each other’s 
behavior, but the argument can be expanded to the study of multiplex networks com-
posed of both formal and informal types of links. We first describe a simple version of 
bonding—multiplex reciprocity—followed by more complex versions that are defined by 
the existence of closure structures involving a larger number of actors.
6. Multiplex Reciprocity
Creating reciprocity across ties of different types, or multiplex reciprocity, is one 
way to mitigate problems of credibility of commitment and decrease the likelihood of 
defection. Multiplex reciprocity occurs when two actors create a reciprocal relationship 
formed by two types of ties, as shown in figure 1B. An example of multiplex reciprocity 
could be city A supplying police services to city B (a formal tie), while city B supplies 
city A with information on how to improve its fire department capabilities (an informal 
tie). In multiplex networks where exchanges involve multiple resources, there are more 
ways in which organizations can create multiplex reciprocity than in networks where 
organizations are linked by only one type of relation. Since these exchanges are maintained 
through mutually supportive relationships, organizations tend to balance their relations by 
entertaining exchange relations across different networks (Lomi & Pattison, 2006).
Multiplex reciprocity creates mutual commitment by both parties and thereby 
reduces the risk of defection. Reciprocity also helps partners to know each other bet-
ter which develops into mutual trust and improves collaboration by reducing behavioral 
uncertainties (Uzzi, 1997). It can develop into expectations of taking turns, mutual obli-
gation, and trust in exchange (Coleman, 1988). This notion is consistent with the social 
capital argument that actors involved in a variety of cross-cutting venues are more likely to 
create mutually trusting environment for improved cooperation (Putnam, 2000).
Reciprocity can also incentivize parties to fulfill their commitment as they can 
 punish each other by declining to cooperate in the next round. The presence of “mutual 
deterrence” (Williamson, 1981), in reciprocal relations also forces both parties to build 
strong, credible ties. In the case of service contractual ties susceptible to opportunism, 
Shrestha and Feiock (2009) found that local jurisdictions in Florida adopted cross-service 
reciprocity because it provided assurance to both the recipient (buyer) and the supplier 
(seller) jurisdictions of the credibility of commitment in service transaction. This suggests 
that policy actors facing cooperation problems in institutional collective action situations 
are more likely to develop multiplex reciprocity to address the problems.
7. Multiplex Triadic Closure
While reciprocity is dyadic, closure in social networks is a group feature. The main 
idea underlying social closure is that actors have a higher tendency to connect with each 
other when they happen to share links with other actors in the network (Snijders, Pattison, 
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Robins, & Handcock, 2006; Robins, Pattison, & Wang, 2009). Formed by path-shortening 
strategies or a direct link between unconnected actors sharing a common partner, such a 
tendency for closure prevents defection more effectively because the parties can better 
monitor each other’s behavior, resolve conflicts through consultations, and impose more 
effective sanctions on wrong doers (Coleman, 1988). Thus, multiplex closure reduces un-
certainty and sustains cooperation in exchange.
Multiplex closure also promotes credible behavior by contributing to building trust 
and group norms to ensure credible commitments (Putnam, 2000). In the context of proj-
ect implementation networks, for example, projects that are supported by a more cohesive 
group of organizations possessing various resources are found to be more successful than 
projects that are supported by a less cohesive group of organizations because the projects 
supported by a cohesive group of organizations are able to secure the credible commitment 
of all the partners (Shrestha, 2013). It is plausible to expect greater prevalence of multiplex 
closure when two actors engage into multiple relationships with multiple shared partners.
Multiplex closure can take different forms. As shown in Figure 1C, multiplex 
transitivity in social networks occurs where actors have a tendency to close open two-
path configuration because of potential defection by the intermediaries. For example, in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, local governments generally maintain direct lobbying 
or information sharing ties with federal agencies as transfer of federal dollars to local 
governments through state agencies can be subject to manipulations by the states. On the 
other hand, when every actor in a group is interlocked with its partner via different ties, 
a multiplex cyclic closure of generalized exchange type is formed (Figure 1D). Multi-
plex closure for shared out-ties (Figure 1E) emerges when two structurally equivalent, yet 
unconnected, cities form closure networks because both share common partners to whom 
they provide resources. Finally, multiplex closure for shared in-ties (Figure 1F) is formed 
when two unconnected, structurally equivalent cities create closure networks because both 
share common partners from whom they receive resources. In both cases, the closure 
can be achieved by sharing information between the previously unconnected, structurally 
equivalent actors. Each of these closure mechanisms promotes cooperation by creating 
social trust and thereby preventing defection. Hence, in general, actors motivated to 
ensuring credibility of commitment of partners in ICA situations should be more likely 
to develop multiplex closed, bonding structures.
8. Challenges
Multiplex network analysis poses challenges for scholars at both theoretical and 
methodological fronts. Theoretically, we need a richer conceptualization of coordination 
and cooperation mechanisms in ICA settings that can guide our thinking of what struc-
tural configurations actors should seek in each type of situation. Further effort is needed 
to understand how networks are shaped when these problems coexist, as it is rare that a 
governance system faces one, but not the other, type of problem. Do actors attend to all 
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problems simultaneously, thus creating both bridging and bonding structures that coexist 
with each other? Or do they attack problems sequentially, prioritizing one type of rela-
tionship over another? If the former is true, are there specific “mixed” configurations that 
are likely to help achieve both coordination and cooperation? If problems are addressed 
sequentially, however, what affects the decisions of the actors to prioritize their problems, 
and how does this affect the sustainability of collaborative practices? Producing answers 
to these questions will require the concerted efforts of public policy and management 
scholars.
There are also important methodological challenges to be faced. Even with just two 
types (formal and informal) of ties, it becomes complex to sort out the various combina-
tions of ties as dependency considerations move from dyadic to triadic and higher levels. 
The choice of a particular effect will require well-developed theory explaining structural 
mechanisms for addressing coordination and cooperation problems. While there has been 
considerable progress in modeling dependencies in multiplex networks (for examples of 
multivariate exponential random graph model specifications, see Pattison & Wasserman, 
1999; Wang, 2013), such modeling is mostly restricted to simple configurations involving 
only two types of ties.
The approach delineated here can also be applied to multiplex networks of multiple 
formal networks or multiple informal networks. For example, a city can enter into more 
than one formal service contracts with another city. Likewise, informal ties between two 
cities could consist of exchange of information and attending the same professional meet-
ings. In other words, ties have weights too, and this introduces another layer of complexity 
which needs to be dealt with.
Finally, for reasons of space we have only covered in slight detail how the different 
configurations indicate bridging and bonding, but more work is needed to clarify exactly 
in what circumstances actors in a network would prefer to form, say, transitive triadic rela-
tionships instead of cyclic triads. The drivers of behavior in these networks will probably 
be highly contextual, depending not only on the problems that the nodes face, but also on 
the nature of the links the researcher is interested in studying. Scholars interested in pursu-
ing any of these ideas must be fully aware of these limitations.
9. Conclusion
In this essay, we made a quick case for simultaneous analysis of multiple networks 
for better understanding of how actors embedded in multiple networks are able to address 
coordination and cooperation problems in ICA situations. In this regard, we highlighted 
the origin and challenges of coordination and cooperation problems in ICA settings, and 
discussed how those problems can be addressed by utilizing bridging and/or bonding capi-
tal in multiplex networks.
Notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological challenges, noted above, we be-
lieve that the multiplex bridging and bonding network structures advanced in this essay 
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for solving coordination and cooperation problems serve as a step forward towards more 
general treatment of embedded relationships in situations where ICA dilemmas take place.
Because of our focus on multiplex networks, we did not highlight the potential 
effect of single network structures on the multiplex network structures. We also limited 
ourselves to the discussion of the emergence of multiplex network structures, rather than 
how these networks impact the outcomes. Investigating the impacts of multiplex networks 
opens a whole new avenue for research with implications on the management of networks. 
The current advancement on both theoretical and methodological fronts offers opportuni-
ties for scholars to develop and test theory explaining the emergence of multiplex net-
work structures and their impacts. This process should pave the way forward in advancing 
the complexity science for better understanding of how actors self-organize to achieve 
 coordination and cooperation in real social networks that are multiplex in nature. We urge 
scholars to join in this collaborative endeavor. 
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